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Abstract 
This multidisciplinary research project examined the role of primary care physicians in 
past pandemic flu responses and current planning efforts.  Project researchers gathered 
and synthesized historical research, state and federal planning documents, and 
interview-based data.  The 1918 influenza pandemic presented one model from which 
to understand the role played by physicians during a large-scale disease outbreak, and 
the challenges they faced.  Contemporary planning documents were assessed for their 
inclusion of primary care physicians.  Literature reviews and interviews comprised the 
principal sources of information.  Findings included the following: (1) primary care 
physicians do not have the time to engage fully in pandemic planning activities; (2) 
physicians are willing to serve during a pandemic; however, government support and 
the availability of resources will affect their level of involvement; (3) communities should 
develop plans for coordinating local physicians that will allow alternative care sites to be 
functionally staffed; and (4) full coordination of physicians is not possible under the U.S. 
healthcare system.    
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Introduction 
Most infectious disease experts believe that the world stands on the verge of an 
influenza pandemic that could cause tens of millions of deaths.1  The realization that the 
U.S. health care system is poorly prepared for such a disaster has prompted detailed 
planning, preparation, and practice for agencies from the local to the international level.2
Primary care physicians, the initial providers of treatment for most Americans, will serve 
as a crucial arm of the public health response to an influenza pandemic.  However, the 
autonomy with which most primary care physicians practice presents a challenge to the 
coordination of the public health system.  The professional independence
  
∗
Background, Rationale, and Research Question 
 of primary 
care physicians begs the following question: are primary care physicians adequately 
integrated into pandemic influenza preparedness planning?  This paper aims to discuss 
the role of primary care doctors during an influenza outbreak.  This will be accomplished 
by reviewing historical examples and examining current preparation and planning 
efforts. 
Influenza is a highly contagious disease of the respiratory tract caused by one of 
several virus types.  The A type virus is generally considered the most threatening to 
human populations, partially because of its ability to be quickly transmitted.  The 
classification scheme for this type includes two antigen glycoproteins: hemagglutinin 
and neuraminidase.  These are abbreviated as H and N, respectively, in the virus name.  
                                                 
∗ While physicians are very altruistic, the medical system in the U.S. does not provide 
systematic control over their practices.  The vast majority of primary care physicians 
practice in private clinics—preventing direct government intervention in their work. 
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These two antigens are used to differentiate various serotypes based on their antibody 
response.  The challenge in battling the Influenza A virus comes from its ability to 
undergo major genetic re-assortment in an animal host resulting in a novel strain.  If this 
new strain becomes capable of human-to-human transmission, it could birth an 
epidemic and cause widespread morbidity and mortality.3  Such an epidemic could 
become a pandemic by moving through populations in more widespread geographical 
locations.4  
Three major pandemics (1918, 1957, and 1968) of influenza have occurred in the 
past century.5 The 1918 pandemic, involving the H1N1 Influenza, was the most 
devastating.  Mortality statistics for this pandemic, though only estimates, have changed 
since the first attempt (in 1927) to quantify the death toll.  Eighty years ago, the 
American Medical Association estimated that 21 million people worldwide died during 
the 1918 pandemic.  More recently, epidemiologists have estimated that the actual 
death toll was more likely around 50 million.6 The U.S. alone lost almost 675,000 people 
out of a population of 105 million; this represented 6.4 per cent of the population.7
When studying the U.S. healthcare response to the 1918 pandemic, it is clear 
that the medical system was overwhelmed.  This was due in part to confusion regarding 
the precise cause of influenza.  At the time, most physicians and researchers still 
believed it to be a bacterium, Pfeiffer’s bacillus.
  
8 This lack of understanding led to the 
trial of many therapeutic techniques.  Everything from saline vaccines and opiates to 
cupping and bleeding was used to treat the seemingly unstoppable disease.  Around 
the world, hospitals were so congested that “it was impossible to remove the dead 
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quickly enough to make room for the dying (p. 364).”6 Individual physicians were left 
virtually empty-handed in facing the disease. 
The 1918 virus was especially virulent.  A typical influenza pandemic produces a 
mortality rate of about 0.1 percent.  The H1N1 virus of 1918 caused the death of 2.5 
percent of those who contracted the virus.1 The mortality was astonishing, but even 
more surprising was the age group that was most violently affected.  Most disease 
pandemics, influenza or otherwise, cause the majority of deaths in the most susceptible 
segments of the population—the very young and the elderly.  In this pandemic, by 
contrast, most deaths occurred among young adults in a war-time context.1, 6  
Since the aftermath of the 1918 pandemic, the world has seen multiple 
epidemics and two pandemics of influenza.  Although science has advanced the 
understanding of the disease and improved the standard of treatment, social and 
technological changes (e.g., faster and more frequent international travel) could cause a 
pandemic to be more widespread.9 In addition, outbreaks of an avian influenza virus, 
especially in Asian countries, have spawned renewed fear of influenza’s virulence in the 
human population.  During 2004, for example,  Vietnam and Thailand both reported 
deaths associated with H5N1.1, 10  The number of confirmed human cases reported by 
the World Health Organization (WHO) has increased steadily, and a November 2007 
report by the WHO estimates, on a worldwide basis, 335 cases and 206 deaths since 
2003.28
The potential for such devastation in the event of a pandemic has challenged 
governments, health agencies, and hospitals to prepare for such a disaster.  Primary 
  If this virus were to become transmissible between humans, it could spread 
with speed and mortality previously unseen in pandemics. 
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care physicians, who will play a key role in the healthcare response, have been forced 
to consider how they should plan and prepare.  However, in the midst of all the 
planning, some physician-based organizations have pointed out that most plans do not 
clearly provide for the involvement of primary care providers. 
The American College of Physicians (ACP), with its 120,000 members, has been 
vocal in responding to this shortcoming.11 In 2006, the ACP described its concerns 
about voids in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Pandemic 
Influenza Plan.  They noted that the HHS plan “provides a much needed step forward 
(p. 16)” but does not describe clearly how medical care will be rationed.12 Additionally, 
the ACP voiced its concern regarding “the plan’s failure to thoroughly incorporate the 
role of physicians in non-hospital based settings in playing a leading role in the health 
care response (p. 16).”12 They pointed out that this inadequacy could have serious 
consequences: 
“Failure to integrate physicians in the local and state health 
care response plans will result in the underutilization of a key 
community resource and may contribute to an unnecessary 
bottleneck in the provision of patient care that will only serve to 
further strain the capacity of the nation’s hospitals for treating 
the most severely ill (p. 16).”12
1. What challenges to physician involvement were uncovered in past influenza 
pandemics, particularly the 1918 pandemic? 
  
 
This uncertainty—whether or not physicians are adequately integrated into pandemic 
response plans—must be addressed.  Two important research questions emerge from 
this uncertainty: 
2. What challenges to physician involvement remain in today’s pandemic-flu 
planning? 
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Methodology 
 Personal interviews, database searches, and literature reviews were used to 
assess the effectiveness of public health preparedness measures, past and present; 
historical research and current planning efforts were examined.  The history of influenza 
epidemics and the health care system’s response to them was analyzed.  The Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and other public health agencies have 
identified the 1918 influenza pandemic as a model from which to understand this 
historical perspective.13 This pandemic was chosen because of its high mortality, speed 
of transmission, and breadth of impact.  Two major historical works, America’s 
Forgotten Pandemic by Alfred Crosby7 and The Great Influenza by John Barry,6 and 
other historical documents were consulted. 
An analysis of current plans in order to understand the role of primary care 
physicians in influenza epidemics was conducted through a literature review and 
multiple interviews.  PubMed14 and Google Scholar15 were used to search for articles 
and research focused on this aspect of public health planning.  Multiple government 
planning documents were obtained and scrutinized for their inclusion of non-hospital 
based physicians.  These included plans from the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS),16 the Kansas Department of Health and Environment 
(KDHE),17 and the World Health Organization (WHO).18 Researchers gathered and 
analyzed planning documents available from private primary care clinics and regional 
hospitals. As Table 1 indicates, multiple perspectives of the healthcare system were 
taken into account.  By considering diverse elements of the healthcare system, a widely 
inclusive frame of reference was obtained (see Table 1). 
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TABLE 1: Areas of research and methods used 
 
Disciplinary methods and  
areas of research 
Databases consulted, major literature reviewed, and 
persons interviewed 
 
Historical research regarding the 
role of physicians and the 
healthcare system in the 1918 
pandemic 
 Journal Storage – JSTOR (keywords: 1918 influenza 
pandemic, influenza pneumonia pandemic) 
 
 Sue Zschoche, PhD – Professor of History, Kansas 
State University, Manhattan, KS 
 
 The Great Influenza by John Barry6
 
 
 America’s Forgotten Pandemic: The influenza of 1918 
by Alfred Crosby7
 
 
 Public Health: Past, Present, and Future edited by Raj 
Bhopal and John Last19
 
 
 
Current planning 
 
 
 
Keyword reviews: 
 
 PubMed (keywords: pandemic influenza, primary care 
physicians and influenza, pandemic preparedness)14
 
 
 Google Scholar (keywords: pandemic influenza, 
influenza preparedness)15
 
 
 Kansas State University Library Catalog (keywords: 
pandemics, influenza planning) 
 
 
Key informant interviews: 
 
 Howard Rodenberg, MD, MPH – Director of Division of 
Health (KDHE)  
 
 Deborah Doubek, MD – Family Physician, Manhattan, 
KS and former president of the Kansas Medical Society 
 
 Dane Ditto, MD – Family Physician, Manhattan, KS 
 
 Joe Phillip, MD – Chief Medical Officer, Mercy Regional 
Health Center, Manhattan, KS 
 
 Dan Leong, Kansas Hospital Association, Topeka, KS 
 
 Mindee Reece, Director, Center for Public Health 
Preparedness, Topeka, KS 
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Results – Historical Research 
 During the 1918 outbreak of influenza, the healthcare system faced challenges 
from many directions.  Some of the issues were circumstantial and specific to the time 
of the pandemic, while others arose from the fledgling public health system and the 
state of the medical establishment.  There are four major factors that either (a) 
influenced why the 1918 pandemic overwhelmed the healthcare system or (b) 
prevented physicians from playing a more influential role in the pandemic response: 
1. Uncontrollable circumstances of the time; 
2. The government (federal, state, or local) supported public health system; 
3. Coordination among the government, private agencies, and the public; and 
4. The training, supply, and coordination of physicians. 
 
The major historical event that influenced the unfolding of the 1918 pandemic 
was World War I (WWI).  The preparations for the war, especially in the U.S., involved a 
massive build-up of troops, concentrating men from different geographic areas and 
facilitating the rapid transmission of the virus.6
In 1918, the major government entity charged with battling infectious disease 
was the United States Public Health Service (USPHS).  However, when the pandemic 
 Additionally, the military expansion 
necessary for war created a shortage of medical personnel, including physicians and 
nurses.  This directly decreased the quality and amount of healthcare available to the 
civilian population during the pandemic.  Although the war contributed to the effects of 
the pandemic, it also provided some benefits to the advancement of public health.  
According to Dr. Sue Zschoche, Professor of History at Kansas State University 
(Interview, April 2007), the military was able to keep precise data regarding the spread 
of the virus through its personnel, the efficacy of various treatments, and the mortality of 
the virus.  These records enabled researchers to learn much from the events of 1918.  
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struck, this federal agency was poorly equipped to handle the massive demand of 
leadership and resources.  While many states and locales had their own public health 
departments, these independent agencies were not integrated effectively at the national 
level.  This lack of cooperation created a challenge for the USPHS to gather data and to 
organize personnel for the needs of individual communities.7
Local public health departments began to appear in America shortly after the 
U.S. Civil War (1861-1865) and would, for at least the next fifty years, struggle to define 
their roles and implement services into the larger systems of healthcare and medicine.
  
20 
These programs were largely born out of the sanitary campaigns of the mid-1800s and 
were relatively insignificant at the turn of the century—focusing almost entirely on the 
physical environment of the community.21 However, as science began to unravel the 
microbiological causes of human disease, public health began to develop as a science 
of its own.  The significance of this new field was reflected in the founding of the first 
institution devoted specifically its study—the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and 
Public Health in 1918.∗
                                                 
∗ Ironically, William H. Welch, the first dean of the school, was not able to attend the opening 
ceremonies on October 1, 1918.  He was sick – likely suffering from contraction of influenza, the 
very disease that his prestigious institution was battling.6  Though the Johns Hopkins School of 
Hygiene and Public Health was the first of its kind in the U.S., Europe had recognized public 
health’s value years before.  In October 1902, The John Usher Institute of Public Health was 
established at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland.  This institution was largely responsible 
for the development of Edinburgh, once a city of stench and filth, into one of the twentieth 
century’s greatest cities.19 
  As a response to new discoveries linking individual illness with 
disease transmission, public health departments began to assume broader roles 
including some aspects of diagnostic medicine.  This widening of responsibility spawned 
conflict between physicians and health departments; physicians strongly objected to the 
“actual or potential encroachment on the area of medical practice and its economic 
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aspect (p. 42).”21 Disagreement over the jurisdiction of physicians and health 
departments contributed to a public health system that was neither organized nor 
effective.  Physicians viewed the treatment of patients by public health departments as 
government funded competition to their businesses and the required reporting of certain 
diseases as an infringement on the patient-doctor relationship.20 While public health 
departments sought to curb disease transmission by treating patients, physicians 
contended for the sovereign right to diagnose and cure.21 
Despite the disagreement with physicians over their respective roles, the 
influence of public health was strong in the early 20th century.  From 1904 to 1924, the 
number of physicians employed by public health departments grew steadily.21 These 
agencies were riding on the wave of effective campaigns such as that of New York 
City’s Metropolitan Board of Health (1866) and the National Association for the Study 
and Prevention of Tuberculosis (1905-1915).20 Although their programs and campaigns 
were somewhat influential, public health departments lacked robust authority and 
struggled to collaborate with physicians; public health departments were unable to 
require the reporting of communicable diseases by doctors in private practice.20 This 
produced a system that was ineffective at gathering data on epidemic disease and 
contributed to the difficulty for the healthcare system to mount an appropriate response 
to the 1918 influenza.7 Over time, public health departments would take an auxiliary role 
to physicians and their efforts in diagnosis and treatment.20
 As the war put a demand on the supply of physicians and the government 
scrambled to organize and disperse those that remained, the entire healthcare system 
struggled to find solutions, leadership, and direction in the face of influenza.  Multiple 
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organizations, from both the government and the private sector, attempted to meet the 
seemingly immeasurable demand for healthcare.  The American Medical Association 
(AMA) appealed to its membership for service to flu victims.7 The American Red Cross 
made an effort to organize both nurses and physicians.6 The USPHS, ill-equipped and 
unprepared, tried to coordinate and ration healthcare to the most needed cities and 
states.6 These efforts failed to designate a central point of leadership: a primary 
coordinator of medical personnel. 
 Clearly, one of the greatest challenges for the medical system in 1918 was the 
inability of physicians to treat influenza correctly and consistently.  Initially, this reality 
was not realized by the scientific and medical community.  In fact, the director of 
Philadelphia’s laboratories stated that Pfeiffer’s bacillus had been isolated as the cause 
of influenza.  It was reported that this finding “armed the medical profession with 
absolute knowledge on which to base its campaign against this disease (p. 72).”7 
Recently armed with advances stemming from germ theory and bacteriology, the 
revelation that no medicine, vaccine, or plan of care was effective was a blow to the 
medical community.  Not even masks, distributed by the millions, were thwarting 
contraction of the disease.6  Preventing exposure by strict quarantine or isolation was 
the only tactic that proved effective.22  Other historical accounts, regarding outbreaks of 
yellow fever in the 1870s for instance, confirm that physicians themselves often 
struggled to apprehend the cause, symptoms, and treatment for infectious diseases.29 
While progress in sanitation was most important in making progress against yellow 
fever, physicians have consistently provided leadership; physicians in Philadelphia, for 
instance, were early to recognize the problem posed by mosquitoes.30  
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The second collective problem in 1918 was that there were simply not enough 
medical doctors.  The shortage of both doctors and nurses left the general public 
scrambling for healthcare and advice.  This was compounded by the military’s 
increasing demand for medical personnel in the war effort.  Tens of thousands of 
physicians were called upon to serve the country’s needs in WWI, and the military 
accepted only those physicians who were qualified.  By the end of the war, 38,000 
physicians were serving the military.  This left the general American public with a 
reduced supply of physicians, and an even smaller supply of competent and well-
educated doctors.6  
 As the outbreak wreaked havoc on communities, facilities were created or 
expanded to deal with the sick, the dying, and the dead.  These haphazardly thrown 
together facilities placed doctors, nurses, orderlies, and other key problem solvers in an 
environment that increased their risk of contracting the virus.  Indeed, a great number of 
them acquired influenza and fell ill.7,13
 While the shortage of physicians alone was a significant burden on the 
healthcare system, challenges arose with regard to identifying properly licensed and 
qualified doctors.  The military did not accept physicians over the age of forty-five; as a 
result, the civilian population was left with many doctors who had been trained in 
archaic and non-scientific ways of medicine.
  
6 The government struggled to coordinate 
the remaining competent physicians.  In January 1918, the Council of National Defense 
created the Volunteer Medical Service Corps (VMSC); the VMSC provided the USPHS 
with a list of physicians willing to serve.7 The enrolled physicians were not enlisted in 
the military for various reasons but had been graded as competent by a local medical 
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committee.23  Unfortunately, the effort failed as the virus spread ubiquitously.  Doctors 
had to tend to their own patients and the government’s pay—$50 a week—was not a 
compelling incentive.6 The VMSC had an enrollment of 72,219 physicians at the end of 
WWI, but only 1,045 physicians would actually serve the USPHS through the corps.23
Results – Current Planning 
  
 In preparing for pandemic influenza, planning authorities have made several 
assumptions to help order ideas and strategies.  These include (1) a pandemic is 
inevitable;24 (2) infection rates will be high, most likely 30% of the population;16 (3) the 
healthcare system will be strained, and care will have to be rationed;12, 24 (4) there will 
be high mortality;16, 24 and (5) it will cause both economic and social disruption.24
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) plan
  
These assumptions, along with others, have guided planning by agencies around the 
world.  This endeavor has been led by the WHO, which released its plan in 1999. 
16, released in 
October 2004, provides for primary care physicians in several ways.  It is divided into 
two parts; the first is a strategic plan on a national scale, and the second is a guide for 
state and local health partners.16 The latter provides supplemental planning guides to 
help both hospitals and non-hospital practices (including private medical practices) 
develop plans for operation during a pandemic.  It acknowledges that “management of 
outpatient influenza cases will reduce progression to severe disease and thereby 
reduce demand for inpatient care (pg. 13).”16 Consequently, the HHS plan provides nine 
recommendations to non-hospital healthcare facilities.  These include development of 
written plans, determination of communication strategies, coping with affected staff and 
employees, and procurement of supplies.16 Another supplement in Part 2 of the plan 
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contains clinical guidelines to aid physicians and other healthcare personnel in 
identifying, classifying, and treating influenza cases.16 The HHS makes 
recommendations to state and local health authorities concerning priority groups for 
vaccination.  Medical workers and healthcare workers are included in the first tier and 
sub-tier of this prioritization.16 Lastly, the monitoring of influenza cases is referred to 
under the presently existing  “Sentinel Provider Network,” a collaboration of 2,300 
physicians and health departments across the U.S. which are responsible for reporting 
cases of influenza.
In October 2005, the KDHE released the Kansas Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness and Response Plan.
16  
17∗ This plan was based on planning 
recommendations from the CDC and WHO.  It addresses the strain that hospitals will 
face in the event of a pandemic, but it does not specifically address physician offices or 
clinics.  KDHE responsibilities in the plan include maintaining the Public Health 
Information Exchange (PHIX) System to communicate information to both public health 
officials and healthcare professionals.  Additionally, the plan acknowledges that the 
State Health Officer has convened a task force to “ensure that the medical community is 
made aware of issues related to pandemic influenza (p. 16).”17
The ACP’s response to the HHS plan is directed at the aspects of the plan that 
“explicitly or implicitly call for the involvement of physicians.”
 This task force has been 
working with organizations such as the Kansas Medical Society (KMS) and the Kansas 
Hospital Association (KHA) to detail the responsibilities of physicians and hospitals.   
26
                                                 
∗ In a 2006 report by the Trust for America’s Health, Kansas ranked second in the nation for 
public health emergency preparedness.25 
 The College’s position is 
outlined in nine different positions.  These positions are summarized in Table 2. 
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TABLE 2: The ACP’s response to the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan26 
Component of the HHS 
Pandemic Influenza Plan ACP position and/or recommendation 
The development of local 
pandemic influenza task forces 
1) Physicians should be integrated into the local task 
forces. 
 
2) All physicians should be provided with a copy of 
state and local plans. 
 
3) Strategies should be developed for the 
procurement of medical supplies for health care 
providers. 
Communication between public 
health authorities and physicians 
1) The Sentinel Provider Network (SPN), which 
currently is used to monitor influenza cases, 
should be expanded to include more physicians.  
 
2) Communication systems should be identified and 
developed which are easy to use and accessible to 
physicians.  
Identification of volunteer 
emergency health care providers 
1) Plans should identify the agency responsible for 
the oversight of volunteers.  
 
2) Volunteer’s licensing should be verified by an 
agency with the proper authority. 
Distribution of vaccine and 
antiviral medications 
1) The current system for delivering seasonal flu 
vaccine should be improved and streamlined. 
 
2) Plans should ensure that physicians will have 
access to vaccine and antiviral medications. 
The use of nonhospital-based 
health care providers 
1) Physicians should be consulted to find the 
alternative sites. 
 
2) Physician leadership should be established for the 
staffing and supplying of alternative care sites. 
 
Howard Rodenberg, Director of the Division of Health within KDHE, is the 
primary official responsible for pandemic flu planning in Kansas.  When presented with 
the ACP’s analysis during an interview (January 2007), Rodenberg commented, “In a lot 
of ways, the ACP has it right.”  He noted, however, that in planning for pandemic illness, 
the federal government does not deal with the individual practitioner; they deal with 
institutions (e.g., the Kansas Medical Society, the Kansas Hospital Association, etc.).  
The following question is begged: is there a role for the individual practitioner?  
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“Absolutely,” responded Rodenberg. He described this role as having three parts: (1) 
being a clinician and treating patients, (2) serving to educate the public, and (3) serving 
as a leader for their community. When asked if physicians are aware of these roles and 
capable of fulfilling them, Rodenberg answered, “As scientists, the physicians are fully 
capable and have the public’s best interests in mind.” He added, “Physicians are busy 
people and it is hard for them to find time to attend more meetings.”   
 This conflict between the need for physicians to be involved in planning and their 
lack of time to do so was echoed by other officials and by physicians themselves.  Mindi 
Reece, Director of the Kansas Center for Public Health Preparedness, is charged with 
guiding the Kansas Pandemic Flu Task Force.  This CDC-funded multidisciplinary task 
force is responsible for building a comprehensive planning document for pandemic flu 
that incorporates many agencies and organizations.  “It has been a challenge to get 
doctors involved,” admitted Reece during a phone interview (April 2007).  The task force 
involves a group of physicians through the University of Kansas Medical Center.  
 Clearly, physician involvement in pandemics is a critical factor in the healthcare 
system’s response.  However, given the complexity and qualitative nature of the topic, 
peer-reviewed research is scarce.  In a study conducted in 2006, 744 emergency and 
primary care physicians were surveyed about their preparedness for incidents of bio-
terrorism and other potential public health emergencies.27 A majority of primary care 
physicians—seventy-seven percent—described influenza as being a greater threat to 
public health than bio-terrorism.  Ninety-three percent of them responded that their local 
health care system needs to be prepared for epidemics such as flu, but only forty-seven 
percent of them felt that the system was prepared already.  The survey also probed the 
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issue of the willingness of physicians to serve during a pandemic.  Fifty-one percent of 
primary care providers said they would volunteer in a medical reserve corps.  Fifty 
percent of them said they would be willing to put their lives at risk of contracting the 
illness if it was the only way to save the lives of others.27 
 A qualitative study published by Australian researchers in 2006 addressed 
general practitioners’ response to pandemic influenza.3 Each of the subjects interviewed 
indicated that they would continue to work during a pandemic.  However, this 
willingness was somewhat dependent upon supportive “education, training, and supply 
of equipment (p. 267)”.3 For example, fifty-five out of sixty of those interviewed said they 
would cease to work if personal protective equipment (e.g., gloves and masks) was not 
available.  They insisted that the government had a responsibility to provide such 
equipment in the event of a pandemic.  Additionally, many of the participants cited the 
care of their own patients as their primary responsibility.  They expressed concern that 
serving at an alternative care site would compromise the well being of their patients.3 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 This paper considered physician involvement in the 1918 influenza pandemic 
and the inclusion of primary care physicians in planning efforts for another similarly-
daunting pandemic.  There are, admittedly, many differences between 1918 and today.  
For example, it is clear that the troop movement and concentration involved with WWI 
had a dramatic effect on the spread of the 1918 virus.  Meanwhile, global travel by 
infected individuals is more likely today than in 1918.   
In light of the 1918 pandemic and current discussions and plans regarding 
influenza, the following conclusions can be made: 
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1) Primary care physicians do not have the time to engage fully in pandemic planning 
activities. Consequently, they must be informed, organized, and led through key 
community officials or appointed leaders.   
2) Physicians are willing to serve during a pandemic.  However, government support 
and the availability of resources will affect their level of involvement.  Physicians 
generally possess an attitude of altruism and public service.  However, as the risk 
to their own health (and that of their staff and families) increases, the willingness of 
physicians to serve will diminish.  Planning must provide for physicians to have 
access to vaccines, antivirals, and protective equipment. 
3) Communities should develop plans for coordinating local physicians that will allow 
alternative care sites to be functionally staffed.  Most physicians work within a 
private practice.  During an influenza pandemic, they will work first to ensure that 
their own patients are cared for.  This will leave few physicians to fill volunteer 
roles.  Alternative care sites (e.g., schools, churches, etc.) established for the 
excess patient load will not help if they do not have sufficient medical personnel.  
4) Full coordination of physicians is not possible under the U.S. healthcare system.  
The historical development of medical practice in the U.S. has contributed to a 
system in which physicians work independently of public health agencies.  There 
will not be a monolithic, standard response by physicians; physicians will choose to 
respond to pandemic conditions differently.  No amount of planning or coordination 
can account for all the variables involved in the healthcare system’s response, 
including physician involvement.  Energy should instead be devoted to providing 
doctors with general resources, information, and support.  
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